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SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Auditors  
of U.S.-Listed Chinese versus U.S. Firms 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study augments prior research by comparing the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 302 
ineffective internal control disclosures (IICs) and Big 4 auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. 
domiciled firms.1  Evidence regarding the IICs and auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms has 
assumed added significance amid allegations that scores of U.S.-listed Chinese-domiciled firms 
filed misleading financial statements that would have benefitted from more effective audits and 
internal controls.2  Our results reveal that IICs are significantly higher for U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms than for matched to U.S.-domiciled firms in 2009, that these findings are concentrated 
among Chinese firms that list directly in the U.S. rather than among Chinese firms that also 
cross-list in China, consistent with additional Chinese regulatory oversight, and that direct-listed 
(cross-listed) Chinese firms are significantly less (more) likely to employ Big 4 auditors than 
either U.S. domiciled or cross-listed Chinese firms.  We further document the Big 4 auditors and 
nature of IICs of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, finding that the IIC types of U.S.-listed Chinese firms 
differed most from their matched U.S. counterparts with relation to financial statement 
preparation, personnel and remediation, and concentrated among Chinese direct-listed firms.  To 
our knowledge, this study is the first to provide direct evidence regarding the IICs and auditors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Section 302 of SOX (2002) requires firms, on a quarterly basis, to certify in SEC filings the effectiveness of 
internal controls and to disclose any material weaknesses as well as any material changes in internal control since 
the last periodic financial report.  Section 404 of SOX requires annual assessments of internal controls supporting 
financial reporting with an accompanying auditor attestation.  Because Section 302 IIC are disclosed quarterly, they 
hold the potential to document IICs that can be remediated before fiscal year-ends and thus not reported under 
Section 404 provisions as detailed below. 
2 See for example, Economist (2011), Market Watch (July 10, 2011), Wall Street Journal (September 29, 2011) and 
Thomson Reuters (September 30, October 19 and November 11, 2011) that reports, “Auditors are not properly 
testing U.S. companies' internal accounting controls, the head of the main auditor watchdog said, while also 
reiterating urgent concerns about audit firm inspections in China.” 
	  
	  
1 
of U.S.-listed Chinese firms. These are matters of immediate and continuing interest to regulators 
and other firm stakeholders in the U.S., China and other countries amid ongoing lawsuits, 
regulatory actions and jurisdictional disputes regarding the disclosures, internal controls and 
audits of Chinese firms listing on non-Chinese exchanges.3 
Prior to 2000, relatively few Chinese firms listed their shares in the U.S. (USCC 2004), 
with most raising equity capital on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock exchanges.  
By 2010, Chinese firms ranked behind only Canadian firms in U.S. stock exchange listings 
(Compustat).  This success of Chinese firms at raising capital in the U.S. did not go unnoticed.  
In 2001, the U.S. Congress held hearings on “Chinese Fundraising Activities in U.S. Capital 
Markets” and in 2004 on “China’s Presence in the Global Capital Markets” (USCC 2001, 2004).   
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in 2002 that U.S. investors 
possessed insufficient information to assess their risks, and further, that it would be difficult to 
pursue U.S.-listed Chinese firms for violations of financial statement certifications and internal 
control sign-offs mandated by SOX (USCC 2002).  These concerns proved prophetic.  
Subsequent allegations of misleading financial disclosures by U.S.-listed Chinese firms triggered 
investigations by the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.S. Congress, U.S. courts, hedge funds and the financial 
press into their financial disclosures and audits, with related investigations underway in other 
countries.4  These investigations include requests by U.S. regulatory authorities for working 
papers related to audits of Chinese firms, some of which have been deemed by Chinese 
authorities to constitute state secrets (Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  For example, “China's auditing train wreck” (Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2012), “PCAOB warns China patience is 
wearing thin (Compliance Week, June 19, 2012).	  
4 For example, investigations in Canada are ongoing regarding financial disclosures and audit reports for Sino-
Forrest Limited (Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2011).	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In response to these allegations, investigations and requests, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) conveyed by letter to the PCAOB that U.S. regulators may 
neither independently nor jointly conduct SOX-related inspections in China (PCAOB 2009).  In 
response to SEC requests to examine the auditing records of Chinese U.S.-listed firms, China’s 
Ministry of Finance instructed Big 4 firms to cede control of their China operations to local 
partners by year-end 2012 and appoint a Chinese partner-in-charge within three years (Wall 
Street Journal, May 9, 2012; May 10, 2012).  China Development Bank, a state-owned lender, is 
providing financing to help Chinese firms delist from U.S. stock markets (South China Morning 
Post, July 12, 2012).  Thus, U.S. regulators have limited and diminishing ability to gather 
evidence when questions arise concerning the financial disclosures of U.S-listed Chinese-
domiciled firms, or the internal controls and auditors on which their veracity depends.5  Helpful 
to this ongoing regulatory conundrum and its resolution is evidence revealing whether and how 
U.S.-listed Chinese differ with regard to SOX Section 302 disclosures and auditors from U.S.-
domiciled counterparts.  This study provides evidence regarding these questions. 
Liu’s (2006) review of research on the financial reporting practices of domestically-listed 
Chinese firms documents previously weak corporate governance practices in China.  More 
recently, Chinese regulatory authorities have implemented provisions designed to enhance both 
internal controls and reporting transparency among Mainland-listed Chinese firms.  Salient 
features of these provisions are pre- and post-listing inspections, audits and certifications of 
internal controls and financial reports.  Many Mainland-listed Chinese firms subsequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The PCAOB specifically cites challenges faced in enforcing SOX reporting requirements for U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms, particularly Section 302 provisions regarding internal controls in settings where audit work which has been 
outsourced by PCAOB-registered firms to local Chinese audit affiliates (see 
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/2010-07-12_APA_6.pdf and 
http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/06012010_GuidanceForNon-USJurisdictions.aspx. This impasse directly 
challenges the position of the SEC’s Deputy Chief Accountant, Brian T. Croteau, who stated that “the ability for the 
PCAOB to conduct the inspections that are mandated by SOX is a very important element of investor protection” 
( http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch120610btc.htm). 
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pursued stock exchange cross-listings in the U.S.  Other Chinese firms chose to list directly in 
the U.S. without listing first or concurrently in China, either because they failed to satisfy 
China’s listing requirements or wished to avoid related delays.  Whereas Chinese regulatory 
authorities assume responsibility for financial disclosures of Mainland-listed Chinese firms, 
including those that cross-list, they consider the financial and audit reports of Chinese firms that 
list directly in the U.S. to be the responsibilities of U.S. exchanges and regulators.  This 
differential treatment by Chinese regulatory authorities raises the question of whether and how 
the SOX Section 302 disclosures and auditors of Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. 
compare with those that cross-list with greater prior Chinese regulatory oversight.  This study 
also provides evidence regarding these questions. 
If differences exist between Chinese and matched U.S. firms in the incidence and nature 
of IICs, a related question is their auditor.  Specifically, it is of interest to know whether 
differences in IICs relate to auditor choice, and in particular, to their use of Big 4 auditors.  Prior 
evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors are associated with more firm material weakness 
disclosures under Section 404 engagements (Ge and McVay 2005) and that audit fees are 
associated with more IICs under Section 302 (Hoitash et al. 2008).6  Big 4 firms are also less 
likely than smaller PCAOB-licensed auditors to rely on outsourced local Chinese affiliates for 
audit work in China rather than using own-firm China-based staff (Gillis 2011). 
Combined, these considerations suggest three related hypotheses examined in this study 
regarding the IICs and auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms.  First, we 
hypothesize that U.S.-listed Chinese firms will report more IICs than comparable U.S.-listed 
U.S. domiciled firms.  Second, we hypothesize that among U.S.-listed Chinese firms, those that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Big four auditors are examined rather than the largest six auditors as in Ge and McVay (2005) because in our 
sample there are six distinct auditing firms using letters BDO in their names, which would make interpretations and 
comparisons challenging.	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cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange will report fewer IICs than those that directly list in the U.S., 
consistent with their additional oversight by Chinese regulators.  Third, we hypothesize that 
direct-listed Chinese firms will report fewer Big 4 audits than their U.S. counterparts in 
comparison with Chinese cross-listed firms.  Finally, we will compare the IIC types and Big 4 
auditors disclosed by U.S.-listed Chinese and matched U.S. domiciled firms. 
As detailed below, we examine fiscal year 2009 because at the time of collection it is the 
most recent fiscal year with available Section 302 data, it is the first year with comparable IICs 
following a period of experimentation and clarifications regarding SOX Section 302 disclosures, 
and it is the last year with IIC data unaffected by allegations of misleading financial disclosures 
by U.S.-listed Chinese firms that began in 2010.  As such, fiscal 2009 is the only recent year with 
data applicable for this study.  We compare for 2009 the IICs and Big 4 auditors of 198 U.S.-
listed Chinese firms (68 cross-listed and 130 direct-listed) with matched U.S.-listed and 
domiciled firms and three-firm portfolios, augmented by multivariate tests to control for other 
factors found related to IICs in prior studies following Doyle et al. (2007b). 
Consistent with these hypotheses, our findings reveal significant differences in the IICs 
and Big 4 audits disclosed by the U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms.  First, we find 
that U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclosed internal controls as ineffective more than twice as often 
as matched U.S. domiciled counterparts.  Second, Chinese direct-listed firms disclosed 
significantly more IICs than U.S. firms in comparison with cross-listed Chinese firms that 
receive more Chinese regulatory oversight.  Third, direct-listed (cross-listed) Chinese firms 
report significantly fewer (more) Big 4 audits than Chinese cross-listed and U.S. domiciled 
firms.  Fourth, the IICs of U.S.-listed Chinese firms relate primarily to financial statement 
	  
	  
5 
preparation, personnel and remediation with further evidence provided regarding Big 4 auditors 
of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms. 
This study contributes to several research literatures.  First, it extends research into how 
SOX Section 302 IICs differ between firms from different domiciles.  Whereas several prior 
studies have examined SOX IICs, they have focused on Section 404 rather than Section 302 
disclosures (e.g., Ghosh and Lubberink 2006; Ogneva et al. 2007; Bedard and Graham 2010; 
Kim et al. 2010; Ye et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Rice 
and Weber 2011), pre-SOX rather than post-SOX periods (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Leone 
2007) or the effects of IICs (e.g., DeFranco and Lu 2005; Doyle et al. 2007a, 2007b; Gupta and 
Nayar 2007; Hammersley et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008, 2009; Beneish et al. 2008; 
Gong et al. 2009, 2010).  While several have examined IICs from different domiciles, they have 
done so at the aggregate level without separately comparing IICs of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. 
domiciled firms (e.g., Ge and McVay 2005; Ye et al. 2010).7 
Second, this study extends research on cross-listings, in particular, how internal controls 
and auditors differ between Chinese domiciled firms that directly list in the U.S. versus those 
that cross-list (e.g., Biddle and Saudagaran 1991, 1995; Karolyi 1998, 2006; Doidge 2004).  
Third, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature, particularly with regard to 
corporate governance practices and their effects for overseas listers (e.g., Licht 2003; Lins 2003; 
Krishnan 2005; Liu 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2007; Zhang et al. 2007).  Specifically, our findings 
regarding the incidence and types of IICs exhibited by U.S.-listed Chinese firms will better equip 
firms, auditors and regulators to manage SOX compliance.  Finally, our results extend an 
emerging literature on corporate governance practices that enhance the quality of accounting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ye et al. (2010) provide evidence that firms with dominant shareholders domiciled in weak investor protection 
countries are less likely to disclose IICs in order to protect management’s private control benefits, which would bias 
against our proposed relations for Chinese versus U.S. domiciled U.S.-listed firms. 
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information available to market participants (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; Reese and Weisbach 
2002; Dechow et al. 2009; Goh 2009; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Johnstone et al. 2010).  
Regulatory authorities have long expressed their intent to advance and enforce provisions that 
improve corporate governance practices by domestic and foreign firms, with evidence on the 
incidence and nature of IICs an important indicator (e.g., PCAOB 2004, 2009; SEC 2002, 2003).  
We are unaware of prior evidence concerning auditors and SOX Section 302 IIC differences 
between U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms.  The following sections of this study 
present our hypotheses, data sources, test results and conclusions, respectively. 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires managers to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
firms’ internal controls over financial reporting and report their conclusions to the public, 
together with any material changes in internal control since the last periodic financial report 
(Section 302) and their external auditor’s attestation (Section 404).8  Whereas several prior 
studies examine Section 404 disclosures, this study utilizes SOX Section 302 disclosures for two 
primary reasons.  First, while it has been argued that Section 404 disclosures provide greater 
validity because they are attested to by external auditors (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007b), it is perhaps 
underappreciated that in both the pre- and post-SOX periods, external auditors remained 
responsible for internal control assessments as part of generally accepted auditing standards and 
standards of fieldwork.  Given that external auditors have similar responsibilities and legal 
exposures for both Section 302 and 404 assessments of internal controls, the validity of the 
Section 302 disclosures is unlikely to differ significantly from those for Section 404 disclosures.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 SOX Section 302 became effective for both U.S. firms and foreign firms listed in the U.S. on the passage of SOX, 
subject to subsequent clarifications described below; Section 404 was introduced in stages beginning with so-called 
accelerated U.S. filers in November 2004.	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Second, SOX Sections 302 and 404 differ significantly in reporting frequency and sensitivity.  
Specifically, Section 302 disclosures are required on a quarterly basis, whereas Section 404 
disclosures are annual, with the opportunity to correct IICs prior to fiscal year end.  Thus, a firm 
could have IICs for quarters one, two and/or three, then remediate in quarter fourth, and avoid 
reporting ineffective controls under Section 404.  In contrast, IICs in any quarter require a 
Section 302 disclosure.  Therefore, we examine SOX Section 302 disclosures so as to more 
completely capture IICs that firms are naturally reticent to report and will work hard to avoid 
disclosing under Section 404 provisions. 
Prior studies have examined both the factors that lead firms to disclose SOX IICs (e.g., 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2000b) as well as the consequences of such disclosures 
(e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007a).  These studies find that risk factors 
including organizational complexity and change, auditor resignations, relative investment in 
internal controls, and incentives to discover and disclose are positively related to IICs.  Ge and 
McVay (2005) describe ten types of IICs:  account specific, training, period end, accounting 
policies, revenue recognition, segregation of duties, account reconciliation, subsidiary specific, 
senior management, technology issues, and no detailed disclosure.  However, they aggregate 
these deficiencies when comparing material weakness and non-material weakness firms.  Doyle 
et al. (2007b) extend these studies by examining material weakness disclosures finding that these 
disclosures are more likely for firms that are smaller, younger, financially weaker, more 
complex, growing rapidly, and/or undergoing restructuring.  Likewise, Doyle et al. (2007a) 
examine material weakness in the aggregate and do not examine or compare specific types of 
weaknesses in their sample.  In comparison, Audit Analytics identifies eighty-two potential issue 
categories or types of IICs that are considered in this study.  Specifically, we compare the IICs 
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and Big 4 auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms and matched U.S. counterparts to address directly 
ongoing debates regarding the adequacy of financial disclosures, audits and internal controls of 
Chinese firms reporting under SOX. 
Our first research question directly addresses whether U.S.-listed Chinese firms differ 
from U.S. firms in the effectiveness of internal controls. Whereas prior studies (Doyle et al., 
2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008) have found that U.S. firms’ Section 302 IIC disclosures 
contain useful information about earnings quality, they did not specifically examine cross-listed 
firms (see Karolyi (2006) for a review of the cross-listing literature).  However, the detection and 
disclosure of IICs may be weaker in countries where investor regulatory protection and corporate 
governance is weak (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Lins 2003).  Ye et al. (2010) observe that, 
“managers of cross-listed firms have a weaker incentive to establish a sound internal control 
system and to expend resources and efforts in detecting and truthfully disclosing internal control 
deficiencies” (p. 3).  Licht (2003) argues that the U.S. regulatory regime that applies to foreign 
firms is significantly inferior to that faced by U.S. firms and the SEC has largely adopted a 
“hands-off” enforcement policy toward cross-listed firms.  Consistent with this view, Ye et al. 
(2010) find that the association between IIC disclosures and earnings quality is significantly 
weaker for cross-listed firms than for U.S. firms.  This reasoning suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: U.S.-listed Chinese firms will report more SOX Section 302 IICs than U.S.-listed and 
domiciled firms. 
Our second research question addresses differences in IICs between Chinese firms that 
list directly in the U.S. and those that also cross-list in China.  To date, studies of foreign firms 
listing in the U.S. have not distinguished between foreign direct- and cross-listed firms, rather 
focusing on cross-listed firms only or grouping these types together.  However, it is plausible to 
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suggest that direct-listed Chinese firms will lack experience and/or be subject to less scrutiny by 
Chinese regulators compared with Chinese cross-listed firms, thus making IIC disclosures more 
likely.  Suggestive evidence is provided by Zhang and King (2010), who examine decisions to 
list abroad by Chinese companies during the period 1993-2005.  They present evidence that 
cross-listing Chinese firms met more stringent legal and accounting standards, listing 
requirements and were subject to closer regulatory monitoring in foreign markets in order to 
obtain external capital for rapid growth, expand their shareholder base and gain expertise, with 
these motives differing by type of issue (ADR versus IPO) and by market (Hong Kong versus 
Singapore).  By extension, China direct-listed firms could face higher hurdles given that they are 
not subject to the Chinese security laws (i.e., CSRC) and regulatory oversight prior to their U.S. 
listings.  Indeed, the SEC has specifically targeted Chinese firms listing their shares in the U.S. 
for investigation in response to these concerns: 
 “The SEC has publicly indicated it was examining accounting and disclosure 
issues regarding Chinese companies that engaged in "reverse mergers," which 
allow companies to list on U.S. exchanges without as much regulatory scrutiny as 
an initial public offering.  People familiar with the matter say the investigation 
also includes auditors, which hadn't previously been known.  As part of its 
inquiry, the SEC has suspended trading on some Chinese companies, questioning 
their truthfulness about their finances and operations” (Wall Street Journal, June 
2, 2011). 
By this reasoning, evidence and immediacy, our second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. will report more IICs than those that cross-list 
in the U.S. in comparison with U.S.-listed and domiciled firms. 
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By this reasoning and recognizing the key role played by auditors in ensuring quality 
financial reporting, our third hypothesis considers differences in the use of Big 4 auditors by 
U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms, and whether these differences extend to Chinese 
direct- versus cross-listed firms: 
H3: Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. will report fewer Big 4 audits than those that 
cross-list in the U.S. in comparison with U.S.-listed and domiciled firms. 
Finally, to better understand the internal control environments of U.S.-listed Chinese and 
U.S. domiciled firms and their auditors in more detail, we present evidence regarding the IIC 
types and Big 4 auditors reported by U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms, thus setting 
the stage for related follow-on research. 
III. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURES 
China-headquartered firms with U.S. share listings are identified using Compustat.  Fiscal 
year 2009 is selected for three reasons.  First, 2009 is the most recent year with available data for 
this study.9  Second, 2009 is the first year with comparable IIC data following a period initial 
discovery, learning and interpretations that began with the passage of SOX, progressed with the 
release of Auditing Standard Number 2 in 2004 and culminated with much needed clarifications 
in Auditing Standard Number 5 issued in 2008.  Third, SOX filings by Chinese firms after 2009 
were subject to intense scrutiny by financial regulators, courts, stock exchanges and the media 
that potentially heighted auditor and management assessments of IICs for years after 2009. 
China headquarters addresses are confirmed using SEC filings, yielding an initial sample 
of 276 U.S.-listed Chinese firms shown in Table 1, Panel A.  Omitting firms with missing SOX 
Section 302 disclosures in the Audit Analytics Disclosure Controls database (46), firms missing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Although 2010 data are also technically available, sufficient time for restatements and amendments to internal 
control disclosures has not passed.	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Compustat data needed for matching (21),10 those in the top and bottom 1% by assets and return-
on-assets (ROA) to reduce the influence of outliers (8) and those without suitable U.S. matches 
as described below (3), yields a final sample of 198 U.S.-listed Chinese firms (Table 1, Panel A).  
Panel B of Table 1 presents their exchange memberships, with most listed on NASDAQ; Panel C 
confirms a wide dispersion across industries. 
______________________ 
 
Table 1 about here. 
______________________ 
 
To ensure the closest possible control group matches between U.S.-listed Chinese and 
U.S. domiciled firms, we employ two approaches.  One approach identifies for each Chinese 
firm a single U.S. domiciled firm that matches most closely according to criteria described 
below.  To reduce the influence of idiosyncrasies in control firms, we also form for each U.S.-
listed Chinese firm a portfolio of the three most closely matched U.S.-listed U.S. domiciled 
firms, using mean characteristics for comparisons.  As indicated in Table 1, Panel A, control 
firms comprise the universe of all U.S.-listed U.S. domiciled firms in Compustat (7,192), minus 
those missing Audit Analytics data (1,861) or Compustat data needed for matching (552), 
resulting in a pool of 4,779 potential U.S. control firms. 
To reduce the role of judgment in the selection of control firms, we employ a Visual 
Basic Applications (VBA) matching program based on industry membership, performance and 
size following the precedents and findings of prior studies including Ge and McVay (2005), 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Zhang et al. (2007).  Given findings in Beasley et al. (2000) 
and Bell and Carcello (2000) of industry concentrations for fraud and weak internal control 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Firms missing assets, revenues and market values are likely shells not representative of operational firms.	  
	  
	  
12 
environments, we apply Standard Industry Code (SIC) industry membership as the first matching 
step.  Following Krishnan (2005), we require a minimum of two SIC digits to be common, as 
well as ensuring that each U.S. domiciled control firm is unique.  Based on SIC data obtained 
from Compustat, this first step results in 56 U.S. firms matched at the four-digit SIC level, 31 at 
the three-digit level and 111 at the two-digit level. 
Our second and third matching steps are based upon the findings of Ge and McVay 
(2005), who find performance and size to be negatively associated with weaknesses in internal 
controls.  Following Ge and McVay (2005), we match on total assets (ASSETS) and return on 
assets (ROA).11  As confirmed below, this matching algorithm produces close matches by 
industry, Total Assets and ROA, and also by other firm characteristics including equity market 
values, net income, operating cash flows and revenues (see discussion of Table 2 in Section IV 
below).  The VBA program is likewise used to form three-firm control portfolios of U.S. 
domiciled firms for each U.S.-listed Chinese firm for robustness checks (also described in 
Section IV below). 
SOX Section IICs are obtained from Audit Analytics.  Following SOX nomenclature, 
Audit Analytics classifies Section 302 IICs into two broad categories entitled “not effective 
accounting” and “not effective other”, respectively.  Within each of these major categories, IICs 
are further classified according to types identified with numbered “Key” codes listed in 
Appendix A.  Examples of actual IIC disclosures by U.S.-listed Chinese firms in our sample are 
presented in Appendix B.  If a firm reports IICs for any quarter of fiscal 2009, they are assigned 
a value of one for INEFFECTIVE IC, and zero otherwise.  Other test variables are defined in 
Table 2 below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ge and McVay (2005) specifically used book value as a measurement of size, but since Compustat no longer 
provides these data, we use total assets, consistent with Zhang et al. (2007) and Krishnan (2005).	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IV. TEST RESULTS 
Comparisons of U.S-listed Chinese and matched U.S. domiciled firms 
Univariate analysis 
Table 2 reports pairwise mean and median comparisons for test variables, matching 
variables and other firm characteristics for three sets of U.S.-listed firms and their matched 
counterparts:  Chinese versus matched U.S. firms in total (Panel A), Chinese direct-listed versus 
matched U.S. firms (Panel B) and Chinese cross-listed versus matched U.S. firms (Panel C). 
Panel A reveals that U.S.-listed Chinese firms report IICs more than twice as often as their 
matched U.S. counterparts, consistent with hypothesis 1. They also employ Big 4 auditors 
significantly less frequently, consistent with hypothesis 3.  Other statistically significant (p < 
0.05) differences indicate that U.S.-listed Chinese firms pay lower audit fees, exhibit faster 
revenue growth and have been SEC-registered for fewer years than their matched U.S. domiciled 
counterparts.  Overall, these results in Panel A of Table 2 lend strong support to hypotheses 1 
and 3.  Statistically insignificant differences between the matched U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. 
firms for the matching variables and other firm characteristics (equity market values, net income, 
operating cash flows, total revenues, or material acquisitions) lend credence to the validity of the 
matching procedure. 
______________________ 
 
Table 2 about here. 
______________________ 
 
Panels B and C of Table 2 reveal striking contrasts between Chinese firms that direct- 
and cross-list in the U.S., consistent with hypothesis 2.  In particular, Panel B reveals that 
support for hypothesis 1 and for other differences between U.S.-listed Chinese cross-listed 
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Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms observed for the combined matched sample in Panel A arise 
largely from Chinese direct-listed firms.  Indeed, Panel C indicates that Chinese cross-listed 
firms do not differ significantly from their matched U.S. counterparts in IICs, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis 1.  Chinese direct-listed firms employ Big 4 auditors significantly 
less frequently than their matched U.S. domiciled counterparts (Panel B, Table 2, consistent with 
hypothesis 3.  In contrast, Chinese cross-listed counterparts employ Big 4 auditors significantly 
more frequently (see Panel C, Table 2) and no less frequently than U.S.-domiciled counterparts.  
Apart from firm age, these subsets of Chinese firms do not differ significantly in other firm 
characteristics compared with their U.S. counterparts, lending further support to the validity of 
the matching procedure. 
Altogether, the univariate results strongly support our hypotheses regarding IICs and Big 
4 auditor differences between U.S.-listed Chinese and matched U.S. firms.  Our results also 
reveal an important distinction between Chinese direct- and cross-listed firms.  For example, 
Chinese firms that cross-list in both the U.S. and China exhibit significantly fewer IICs, lower 
returns on assets, larger assets, larger equity market values, greater use of Big 4 auditors, lower 
revenue growth and more years of SEC registration than Chinese firms that directly list in the 
U.S.  Therefore, one might suggest that these differences might be explained alternatively by 
differences in Big 4 audits, firm size and age.  For example BIG 4 AUDITOR is positively and 
significantly correlated with MARKET CAP (p < 0.05) and FIRM AGE (p < 0.10), and both BIG 
4 AUDITOR and FIRM AGE are positively and significantly correlated with INEFFECTIVE IC 
(p < 0.05).  To control for these associations, we provide a multivariate analysis below. 
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______________________ 
 
Table 3 about here. 
______________________ 
 
Multivariate analysis 
Following Ge and McVay (2005) and Hoitash et al. (2008), we estimate the following 
logit model to test our hypotheses while controlling for other differences in firm characteristics: 
INEFFECTIVE IC = a + β1 DIRECT LISTED CHN + β2 CROSS LISTED CHN + β3 
ROA + β4 LOG OF ASSETS + β5 LOG OF MARKET VALUE + β6 NET INCOME + β7 
CFO/ASSETS + β8 BIG 4 AUDITOR + β9 AUDIT FEES + β10 REVENUE + β11 
REVENUE ∆ + β12 MATERIAL ACQUISITIONS +e 
 
where INEFFECTIVE_IC is an indicator variable equal to one if management determined 
internal controls to be ineffective under Sarbanes Oxley Section 302, in at least one quarter of 
fiscal year of 2009; DIRECT LISTED CHN is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
Chinese domiciled and directly listed in U.S.; CROSS LISTED CHN is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm is Chinese domiciled and is listed both in China and in the U.S. and other 
variables are as defined above. 
As reported in Table 4, the model is statistically significant with a likelihood ratio Chi-
square of 539.715 and p-value < 0.0001.  The coefficient estimates for LOG OF ASSETS and 
LOG OF MARKET VALUE are significant (p < 0.01) and negative, in the same direction as 
reported by Ge and McVay (2005).  Similarly, the estimates for AUDIT FEES are significant (p 
< 0.01) and positive, in the same direction as reported by Hoitash et al. (2007), implying that 
larger firms are less likely to have IICs.  In contrast, the coefficient estimate for BIG 4 
AUDITOR is significant (p < 0.01) and negative, in the opposite direction as that reported by Ge 
and McVay (2005), perhaps attributable to lower ages and smaller sizes of Chinese firms.  
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Consistent with hypotheses 1, coefficients are positive and significant for DIRECT LISTED CHN 
(p < 0.01) and CROSS LISTED CHN (p < 0.05).  Comparing DIRECT LISTED CHN and CROSS 
LISTED CHN a Wald Chi-Square of 3.219 is significant at the one-tail test level (p <0.0728), 
thus providing moderate support for hypothesis 2 that Chinese cross-listed firms disclose fewer 
IICs than direct-listed Chinese firms. 
______________________ 
 
Table 4 about here. 
______________________ 
 
Big Four auditors 
Table 5 provides evidence regarding the numbers of direct- and cross-listed Chinese 
firms and their matched U.S. domiciled counterparts audited by Big 4 firms:  Chinese versus 
matched U.S. firms in total (Panel A), Chinese direct-listed versus matched U.S. firms (Panel B), 
Chinese cross-listed versus matched U.S.- firms (Panel C), and an unmatched comparison of 
Chinese cross-listed versus Chinese direct-listed firms (Panel D).   In each panel we present the 
number and percentage of firms with Big 4 audits in fiscal 2009, with results again striking.  For 
the overall comparison (Panel A), U.S. domiciled firms use significantly (p < 0.05) more Big 4 
auditors (50.51%) compared with matched Chinese counterparts (38.39%).  However, when the 
U.S.-listed Chinese direct- and cross-listed firms are compared in Panels B and C, significant 
differences are observed.  Whereas Chinese direct-listed firms employed significantly (p < 0.05) 
fewer Big 4 auditors (9.23%) than their matched U.S. counterparts (40.77%) (Panel B), Chinese 
cross-listed firms employed significantly (p < 0.01) more Big 4 auditors (95.59%) than their 
matched U.S. domiciled counterparts (69.12%) (Panel C).  Unmatched comparisons (Panel D) 
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confirm that direct-listed Chinese firms to employ significantly (p < 0.000) fewer Big 4 auditors 
than cross-listed Chinese firms. 
Table 5 further reveals Big 4 auditors by firm type.  Panel A reveals a statistically 
significant difference (p < 0.000) only for Ernst & Young in the percentage of audits of U.S.-
listed Chinese (7.07%) and matched U.S. domiciled firms (18.69%).  However, this combined-
sample results is seen in Panels B and C to arise from an averaging of contrasting sub-samples of 
Chinese U.S.-listed firms.  Panel B reveals Ernst & Young, PwC and Deloitte & Touche to audit 
significantly more U.S. domiciled firms than matched direct-listed China domiciled counterparts.  
In contrast, Panel C reveals Deloitte & Touche to audit a significantly (p < 0.000) greater 
percentage of Chinese cross-listed firms (35.29%) than their matched U.S. domiciled 
counterparts (10.29%), with other Big 4 auditors showing statistically insignificant differences.  
Unmatched comparisons in Panel D find all Big 4 firms to audit significantly greater percentages 
of cross-listed than direct-listed Chinese firms.12 
______________________ 
 
Table 5 about here. 
______________________ 
 
 
Comparisons of Ineffective Internal Control (IIC) types disclosed by U.S.-listed Chinese and 
matched U.S. firms 
Table 6 presents types of IICs by U.S.-listed Chinese firms compared with their matched 
U.S. domiciled counterparts:  Chinese versus matched U.S. domiciled firms in total (Panel A), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Considered individually, whereas Deloitte & Touche is the only Big 4 firm to audit a larger percentage of U.S.-
listed Chinese firms than U.S. domiciled counterparts (Panel A, statistically insignificant), it is also the only Big 4 
firm to audit significantly fewer (more) Chinese direct- (cross-) listed firms compared with U.S. domiciled 
counterparts (Panels B and C).  KPMG audits a significantly smaller percentage of direct-listed Chinese firms 
compared with U.S. counterparts (Panel B); KPMG shows no statistically significant differences across Panels A 
through C; Ernst & Young exhibits significantly more audits for U.S.-listed and domiciled firms than for Chinese 
counterparts overall (Panel A) and in comparison with Chinese direct-listed firms (Panel B).  These patterns may 
reflect opportunities or strategies that can be examined further in future studies. 
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Chinese direct-listed versus matched U.S. firms (Panel B), and Chinese cross-listed versus 
matched U.S. firms (Panel C).  Presented for each panel are all IIC types where the incidence of 
disclosure differs at a statistically significant level in Panel A, B or C.  Following Audit 
Analytics, we classify IIC types into two categories: “not effective accounting” internal control 
issues and “not effective other” internal control issues. 
Panel A of Table 6 indicates that U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclose seven “accounting” 
type IICs and eight “other” type IICs, significantly more often than their matched U.S. domiciled 
counterparts, with all differences statistically significant beyond the .10 level.  However, Panels 
B and C reveal that these combined sample results largely reflect IICs for Chinese direct-listers 
that differ significantly from those of Chinese cross-listers.  Mirroring Panel A, Panel B indicates 
that direct-listed Chinese firms have significantly more “accounting” IICs relating to financial 
statement preparation (34 versus 3 for U.S. counterparts); current asset and collectables (17 
versus 1 for U.S. counterparts); and related parties and subsidiaries (17 versus 3 for U.S. 
counterparts).  These findings may reflect fewer accountants in China familiar with U.S. 
accounting standards, the ongoing transition of China’s economy from state ownership with 
traditionally historical-cost-based asset valuations, less formal cash-focused transaction 
accounting, and generally less transparent ownership structures involving elaborate cross 
holdings between dozens and even hundreds of entities. 
______________________ 
 
Table 6 about here. 
______________________ 
 
Among the “other” IIC types, direct-listed Chinese firms exhibit significantly more IICs 
relating to personnel (59 versus 16 for U.S. counterparts); previously reported SOX Section 404 
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issues (50 versus 16 for U.S. counterparts); and period-end adjustments and corrections (17 
versus 3 for U.S. counterparts).  These findings may reflect a lack of qualified financial 
management talent to manage and translate formal systems of documentation that a Chinese firm 
might have, “tone at the top” to prioritize the remediation of weaknesses, and generally lower 
emphasis on fraud prevention in a traditionally “gifting” cultural milieu emphasizing personal 
relationships rather than common-law-based contracting. 
In striking contrast, Chinese cross-listed firms (Panel C) exhibit IICs that are statistically 
indistinguishable from their U.S. counterparts, the only exception being previously reported SOX 
Section 404 issues (Key 53), where Chinese cross-listed firms report significantly fewer IICs 
than their U.S. counterparts.  Combined, these findings indicate that the higher incidence in IICs 
found in Panel A between U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms is attributable to direct-
listed Chinese firms.  They lend further support to hypothesis 2 and will help inform regulatory 
responses.  Finally, we repeat the tests above with each U.S.-listed Chinese firm matched with a 
portfolio of three U.S. domiciled firms (untabulated) to control for random variation and 
matching error, with qualitatively similar findings.  This lends further support to the validity of 
our findings and to the matching procedure employed (results available on request).	  
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Combined, the findings above lend strong support to hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.  Specifically, 
U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclose IICs significantly more often than matched U.S. domiciled 
firms in fiscal year 2009, consistent with hypothesis 1.  Consistent with hypothesis 2, these 
differences are attributable primarily to Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. rather than to 
those that cross-list both in the U.S. and China and are thus subject to greater oversight by 
Chinese regulatory authorities.  Our evidence also supports hypothesis 3 in suggesting that 
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Chinese firms use Big 4 auditors less than matched U.S. domiciled counterparts, where once 
again, this result is explained primarily by Chinese direct-listed firms, with Chinese cross-listed 
firms found to utilize Big 4 auditors to an even greater degree than their U.S. counterparts.  The 
generally insignificant differences observed for the matching criteria and other firm 
characteristics lend credence to the VBA matching procedure.  Multivariate tests lend further 
support to these findings by controlling for factors identified in prior studies are related to IICs 
for a control group comprised of all U.S.-listed and domiciled firms with available data 
following the design of Ge and McVay (2005) and Hoitash et al. (2008). 
In perspective, our findings that U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclosed IICs significantly 
more than matched U.S. domiciled counterparts is perhaps reflective of two features of Chinese 
firms.  First is a condition of generally weaker incentives to disclose ineffective internal controls 
than for U.S. domiciled firms arising from generally less transparent reporting practices and 
norms, perceptions of lower enforcement and legal risk, and traditions of confidentiality and 
reserve regarding revelations of governance weaknesses.  Second, even for those motivated to 
disclose identified IICs, there are practical difficulties arising from language and interpretation, 
unfamiliarity with SEC and SOX reporting requirements and a scarcity of appropriately trained 
and experienced managers, accountants and auditors.  Yet whereas direct-listed Chinese firms 
exhibit significantly lower levels of Big 4 audits than their U.S. counterparts and significantly 
more IICs, our evidence indicates that cross-listed Chinese firms exhibit both similar levels of 
IICs as their matched U.S. counterparts and an even greater usage of Big 4 auditors.  Thus, the 
IICs and Big 4 audits among U.S.-listed Chinese firms are clearly revealed to differ between 
those Chinese firms that cross-list and those Chinese firms that list directly in the U.S., which 
can help inform auditor, regulator, exchange and investor responses accordingly.  Our further 
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evidence comparing the IIC types and Big 4 auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese and matched U.S. 
firms will further help guide these responses. 
This study augments prior findings by comparing the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 302 
IICs and auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms, where Section 302 disclosures 
offer potentially more complete and timely indicators of IICs in this context.  Our evidence has 
gained added significance and immediacy in view of recent allegations that scores of Chinese 
firms filed misleading financial statements under SOX regulations.  Our findings reveal that 
under Section 302, U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclosed IICs more than twice as often as matched 
U.S. domiciled firms in 2009, that direct-listed Chinese firms disclosed IICs significantly more 
often than cross-listed Chinese firms, consistent with additional regulatory oversight in China, 
and that direct-listed (cross-listed) Chinese firms are significantly less (more) likely to employ 
Big 4 auditors than either U.S. domiciled or cross-listed Chinese firms.  We further document 
both the Big 4 auditors and nature of IICs of U.S.-listed Chinese and matched U.S domiciled 
firms, finding that the IIC types of U.S.-listed Chinese firms differ most from their matched U.S. 
domiciled counterparts in relation to financial statement preparation and personnel, concentrated 
primarily in Chinese direct-listed firms.  To our knowledge, this study is the first to provide 
direct evidence regarding the effectiveness of the IICs and auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, 
matters of immediate and continuing interest to regulators and other stakeholders in the U.S., 
China and other countries. 
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TABLE 1. Sample selection 
Panel A: Initial samples by selection procedure 
  
U.S.-listed Chinese domiciled firms (Compustat)           276  
Less:   
 Firms missing Audit Analytics SOX Section 302 data           (46) 
 Firms missing Compustat data (assets, revenues, etc.)           (21) 
 Top and bottom 1% ROA             (4) 
 Top and bottom 1% Assets             (4) 
 No suitable matching U.S. firm             (3) 
 Final Chinese firm sample size           198  
   
U.S.-listed U.S. domiciled firms        7,192  
Less:   
 Firms missing Audit Analytics SOX Section 302 data      (1,861) 
 Firms missing Compustat data (assets, revenues, etc.)         (720) 
 Final U.S. matching firm sample size        4,611  
   
 
Panel B: Matched samples by stock exchanges 
Stock 
Exchange NASDAQ NYSE AMEX OTC & Other Total 
U.S.-listed 
Chinese 
firms 
109 46 18 25 198 
 55.1% 23.2% 9.1% 12.6% 100.0% 
      
U.S.-listed 
U.S. firms 120 30 14 34 198 
 60.6% 15.2% 7.1% 17.2% 100.0% 
 
Panel C: U.S.-listed Chinese firms by industry 
Industry Numbers Percent Industry Numbers Percent 
Computers 37 18.7% Banks 9 4.5% 
Drugs 22 11.1% Food 8 4.0% 
Rubber 17 8.6% Mining 6 3.0% 
Services 16 8.1% Misc Equipment 4 2.0% 
Electrical 15 7.6% Textiles 4 2.0% 
Chemicals 14 7.1% Utilities 4 2.0% 
Transportation 14 7.1% Agriculture 3 1.5% 
Industrial 12 6.1% Refining 3 1.5% 
Retail 10 5.1% Totals 198 100% 
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TABLE 2. Comparisons of U.S-listed Chinese and matched U.S. domiciled firms 
 
Panel A    
U.S.-listed 
Chinese firms (n = 198) 
 U.S.-listed 
U.S. firms (n=198) 
  
        
    Mean   Median  
 
Std. Dev.  Mean   Median  
 
Std. Dev. 
t-statistic 
p-value   
Wilcoxon  
p-value    
 INEFFECTIVE IC 0.293  0.000 .456  .131  0.000 .339  0.000  ***  0.000  ***  
 ROA  0.061  0.070  .125 0.056  0.064  .117 0.697   0.681    
 ASSETS  1,758.770  163.180  10,464 1,424.640  142.925  11,928 0.767    0.072   
 MARKET VALUE  1,267.590  183.645  6,133 1,391.710  157.736  11,053 0.890   0.193    
 NET INCOME  72.597   9.625  669 76.128  4.907  748  0.961    0.312    
 CFO/A     0.083  0.080  .131 0.091  0.101  .149 0.546   0.115    
 BIG 4 AUDITOR  0.389  0.000    .489  0.505  1.000  .501  0.020  **   0.020   **  
 AUDIT FEES    0.698   0.323  1.263 0.796  0.488  1.728  0.516     0.027   **  
 REVENUE   1,564.350   98.325  14,194 1,172.840  129.382  11.346  0.762    0.381    
 REVENUE ∆    0.206   0.150  .525 0.183  0.007  1.303  0.813    0.001  ***  
 FIRM AGE  3.598   3.000  1.970 16.703  15.00 8.591  0.000  ***  0.000  ***  
 ACQUISITIONS  0.091  0.000    .288 0.076  0.000 .265  0.587    0.587    
Panel B    
 
Direct-listed  
Chinese firms (n = 130) 
 
U.S.-listed  
U.S. firms (n = 130) 
  
        
     Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean   Median  Std. Dev. 
 t-statistic 
p-value  
  Wilcoxon  
p-value    
 INEFFECTIVE IC 0.393  0.000 .490 0.131  0.000 .338 0.000  ***  0.000  ***  
 ROA  0.077  0.090  .130 0.071  0.082  .121 0.704    0.568    
 ASSETS  1,170.747 100.775  11,265 1,479.520  77.871  14,428 0.848    0.211    
 MARKET VALUE  793.678  106.941  6,687 1,492.341  91.454  13,561.6 0.599    0.667    
 NET INCOME  80.441  8.645  793  92.670  4.295  919 0.909     0.374    
 CFO/A     0.080   0.080  .136 0.079  0.093  .172  0.969    0.464    
 BIG 4 AUDITOR  0.092  0.000 .291 0.408  0.000 .493  0.000  ***   0.000  ***  
 AUDIT FEES    0.407  0.186  1.171   0.658  0.319  2.043  0.225     0.000  ***  
 REVENUE  1,645.755   76.205  17,272 1,406.788  80.827  13,957  0.902     0.576    
 REVENUE ∆ 0.275   0.205  .588   0.230  0.009  1.525 0.753    0.001  ***  
 FIRM AGE  3.340  3.000  1.880  17.110  16.000  8.812 0.000  ***  0.000  ***  
 ACQUISITIONS  0.085  0.000 .279  0.046  0.000 .211 0.211    0.211    
a Significance levels .01*** and .05** 
b ROA and ASSETS were the basis for matching. 
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TABLE 2. (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C    
Cross-listed 
Chinese firms (n = 68) 
  
U.S.-listed  
U.S. firms (n = 68)         
     Mean   Median  
Std. 
Dev.  Mean   Median  Std. Dev. 
 t-statistic  
p-value    
 Wilcoxon  
p-value    
 INEFFECTIVE IC 0.103  0.000 .306       0.133  0.000 .341 0.598          0.599    
 ROA  0.030     0.035  .110   0.027   0.032  .104 0.892        0.995    
 ASSETS    2,882.935   410.259  8,697 1,319.723   279.757  4,190 0.185       0.030   **  
 MARKET VALUE   2,173.610   501.624  4,819 1,199.329   355.490  2,250 0.134      0.045    
 NET INCOME      57.602    12.625  323   44.502     7.289  130 0.758        0.564    
 CFO/A         0.088     0.088  .122    0.114    0.107  .088 0.151       0.072    
 BIG 4 AUDITOR        0.956     1.000  .207    0.691    1.000  .465 0.000  ***     0.000   ***  
 AUDIT FEES         1.254     1.019  1.254     1.061     0.884  .794 0.286        0.177    
 REVENUE    1,408.734  223.440  4.246  725.581   237.605  1.767 0.224           0.716    
 REVENUE ∆         0.075     0.060  .336     0.093   -0.020  .710 0.854          0.231    
 FIRM AGE - YEARS       4.092     3.000  2.056   15.926   15.000  8.160 0.000  ***      0.000   ***  
 ACQUISITIONS         0.103  0.000    .306    0.132  0.00 .341 0.598        0.599    
a Significance levels .01*** and .05** 
b ROA and ASSETS were the basis for matching. 
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TABLE 2.  (continued)	  
 
Variable Definitions: 
 
INEFFECTIVE IC 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
ASSETS 
 
MARKET VALUE 
 
 
NET INCOME  
 
CFO/A 
 
 
BIG 4 AUDITOR 
 
 
AUDIT FEES 
 
 
REVENUE 
 
REVENUE ∆ 
 
 
FIRM AGE 
 
 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if management determined 
controls to be ineffective under Sarbanes Oxley Section 302 
in at least one quarter of fiscal year of 2009 (Audit Analytics) 
 
Net income divided by total assets for fiscal year 2009 
 
Total assets at fiscal year end 2009 (Compustat) 
 
Stock price multiplied by shares outstanding at fiscal year 
end 2009 (Compustat) 
 
Net income for fiscal year 2009 (Compustat) 
 
Cash from operations divided by assets at fiscal year end 
2009 (Compustat) 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if audited by Big 4 firm for 
fiscal year 2009 (Audit Analytics) 
 
All fees paid to independent auditor for fiscal year 2009 
(Audit Analytics) 
 
Gross income for fiscal year 2009 (Compustat) 
 
Change in revenue between fiscal years 2008 and 2009 
(Compustat) 
 
Number of quarters since first  quarterly or annual filing 
submitted to SEC by end of fiscal year 2009 (Compustat) 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if acquisitions greater than 
5% of the firm’s total assets occurred in fiscal year 2009 
(Compustat) 
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TABLE 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Variables  
IN
EFFEC
TIVE 
IC
 
RO
A  
ASSETS 
M
ARK
ET 
VALU
E 
 N
ET IN
C
O
M
E 
C
FO
/A   
 BIG
 4 
AU
D
ITO
R  
 AU
D
IT FEES 
REVEN
U
E 
TO
TAL 
REVEN
U
E ∆ 
FIRM
 AG
E 
AC
Q
U
ISITIO
N
 
INEFFECTIVE IC 1.000 0.022 0.055 0.062 0.060 0.107 0.268 0.111 0.045 -0.018 0.211 0.000 
	    (0.6560) (0.2708) (0.2179) (0.2312) (0.0327) (0.0001) (0.0277) (0.3743) (0.7260) (0.0001) (1.0000) 
ROA  1.000 -0.015 0.022 0.049 0.355 -0.067 -0.054 -0.001 0.222 -0.050 -0.001 
	     (0.7755) 0.6720  (0.3336) (0.0001) (0.1856) (0.2832) (0.9921) (0.0001) (0.3242) (0.9989) 
ASSETS   1.000 0.960 0.963 0.344 0.142 0.908 0.950 -0.040 0.095 -0.027 
	      (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.5066) (0.0050) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.4253) (0.0597) (0.5880) 
MARKET VALUE    1.000 0.952 0.060 0.142 0.911 0.898 -0.037 0.099 -0.016 
	       (0.0001) (0.2303) (0.0045) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.4788) (0.0499) (0.7541) 
NET INCOME     1.000 0.057 0.103 0.861 0.973 -0.027 0.083 -0.017 
	        (0.2595) (0.0401) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.5919) (0.0985) (0.7390) 
CFO/A        1.000 0.110 0.067 0.036 -0.080 0.102 0.085 
	         (0.0292) (0.1860) (0.4718) (0.1449) (0.0420) (0.0902) 
BIG 4 AUDITOR       1.000 0.366 0.108 -0.081 0.088 0.023 
	          (0.0001) (0.0311) (0.1062) (0.0802) (0.6486) 
AUDIT FEES        1.000 0.819 -0.077 0.133 -0.004 
	           (0.0001) (0.1251) (0.0079) (0.9424) 
REVENUE          1.000 -0.039 0.071 -0.025 
	            (0.5025) (0.1601) (0.6260) 
REVENUE ∆          1.000 -0.113 0.004 
	             (0.0240) (0.9400) 
FIRM AGE           1.000 -0.051 
	              (0.3084) 
ACQUISITIONS                       1.000 
a See Table 2 for variable definitions (n = 396).
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TABLE 4. Logistic Regression 
 
	  
	   	  
  Dependent Variable  
 INEFFECTIVE IC  
Independent variables Parameter Estimate (t-stat) 
INTERCEPT -0.383 *** 
 (7.4512) 
 
DIRECT LISTED CHN 1.6613 *** 
 (68.4562) 
 
CROSS LISTED CHN 0.8428 ** 
 (4.1398) 
 
ROA -0.2579 *** 
 (13.4126) 
 
LOG OF ASSETS -0.1508 *** 
 (15.8592) 
 
LOG OF MARKET VALUE -0.2489 *** 
 (38.3703) 
 
NET INCOME -0.0009 *** 
 (8.3175) 
 
CFO/A 0.305 * 
 (2.7381) 
 
BIG 4 AUDITOR -0.4212 *** 
 (9.1481) 
 
AUDIT FEES 0.0001 *** 
 (47.2809) 
 
REVENUE -0.0001 *** 
 (6.6318) 
 
REVENUE ∆ 0.2119 *** 
 (16.9924) 
 
MATERIAL ACQUISITIONS -0.0236  
 (0.0088) 
 
  
 
Number of total observations 4,809  
Likelihood ratio chi-square 539.715  
p-value < 0.0001 *** 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test 11.8427  
p-value 0.1584   
a Numbers in brackets indicate Wald chi-square statistics. 
b *** indicates significance at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
c The variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers.  
d FIRM AGE not included in this analysis, as hand collecting these data for 4,809 firms was impractical 
and other sources were found to be unreliable. 
e Variable Definitions (not listed in Table 2): 
DIRECT LISTED CHN = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is directly listed in U.S. 
CROSS LISTED CHN = Indicator variable equal to one if firm is listed both in China and in the U.S 
LOG OF ASSETS = Natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year 2009. 
LOG OF MARKET VALUE = Natural log of stock price multiplied by shares outstanding at fiscal year 
end 2009. 
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TABLE 5. Big Four Auditors 
 
 U.S.-listed Chinese firms U.S.-listed U.S. firms 
 
 
Panel A   (n = 198) (n = 198)     
Big Four Auditors # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms 
p-
value  
  
Deloitte & Touche  27 13.64% 18 9.09% 0.205  
PwC  21 10.61% 25 12.63% 0.638  
KPMG  15 7.58% 20 10.10% 0.479  
Ernst & Young  14 7.07% 37 18.69% 0.000 *** 
Audited by Big Four 77 38.89% 100 50.51% 0.026 ** 
      
 
 
Direct-listed Chinese firms U.S.-listed U.S. firms 
 
 
Panel B (n = 130) (n = 130)     
Big Four Auditors # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms 
p-
value  
  
Deloitte & Touche  3 2.31% 11 8.46% 0.051 * 
PwC  4 3.08% 13 10.00% 0.042 ** 
KPMG  3 2.31% 8 6.15% 0.217  
Ernst & Young  2 1.54% 21 16.15% 0.000 *** 
Audited by Big Four 12 9.23% 53 40.77% 0.000 *** 
       
 Cross-listed Chinese firms U.S.-listed U.S. firms  
 
Panel C (n = 68) (n = 68)     
Big Four Auditors # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms 
p-
value  
  
Deloitte & Touche  24 35.29% 7 10.29% 0.000 *** 
PwC  17 25.00% 12 17.65% 0.403  
KPMG  12 17.65% 12 17.65% 1.000  
Ernst & Young  12 17.65% 16 23.53% 0.525  
Audited by Big Four 65 95.59% 47 69.12% 0.000 *** 
       
	  
Direct-listed Chinese firms Cross-listed Chinese firms 
 
 
Panel D (n = 130) (n = 68)     
Big Four Auditors # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms 
p-
value  
  
Deloitte & Touche  3 2.31% 24 35.29% 0.000 *** 
PwC  4 3.08% 17 25.00% 0.000 *** 
KPMG  3 2.31% 12 17.65% 0.000 *** 
Ernst & Young  2 1.54% 12 17.65% 0.000 *** 
Audited by Big Four 12 9.23% 65 95.59% 0.000 *** 
a Significance levels .01***, .05** and .10*  
b A two-sample test of whether the proportions of two independent Bernoulli populations are 
identical.  As the sample size is not large, we use the Fisher exact test to compute the p-value for 
H0: c1 = c2 versus H1: c1 not equal c2 (two tail test), where c = number of cases / n. 
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TABLE 6. Comparisons of Ineffective Internal Control (IIC) types disclosed 
 
 
 U.S.-listed U.S.-listed 
 
 
Panel A:  U.S.-listed Chinese and matched U.S. domiciled firms Chinese firms (n = 198) U.S. firms (n = 198)     
 
# of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms p-value  
  
Not Effective Accounting IICs             
Financial statement preparation related issues (Key 40) 37 18.69% 3 1.52% 0.000 ***  
Current assets/investments/collectables related issues (Key 15) 22 11.11% 2 1.01% 0.000 ***  
Related party/subsidiary related issues (Key 38) 19 9.60% 4 2.02% 0.002 ***  
Inventory/cost of sales/ vendor rebate related issues (Key 32) 15 7.58% 6 3.03% 0.071 * 
Accrual/identification of liability related issues (Key 33) 14 7.07% 5 2.53% 0.057 * 
Recording of financing/bank/securities debt or equity related issues (Key 47) 10 5.05% 3 1.52% 0.087 * 
Other (Key 68) 37 18.69% 8 4.04% 0.000 *** 
Not Effective Other IICs             
Personnel related issues (Key 51) 69 34.85% 23 11.62% 0.000 ***  
Previously reported 404 issue, which continues to be disclosed under 302 (Key 63) 50 25.25% 25 12.63% 0.002 ***  
Period end adjustment/correction related issue (Key 53) 19 9.60% 11 5.56% 0.183  
Corporate governance related issues (Key 70) 15 7.58% 2 1.01% 0.002 ***  
Fraud risk related issues (Key 85) 11 5.56% 0 0.00% 0.000 ***  
Ethics code related issues (Key 84) 10 5.05% 1 0.51% 0.011 ** 
Demographic in nature - small size is said to impact controls (Key 66) 8 4.04% 1 0.51% 0.037 ** 
Whistleblower policy related issues (Key 82) 5 2.53% 0 0.00% 0.061 * 
Other (Key 50) 67 33.84% 30 15.15% 0.000 ***  
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Direct-listed U.S.-listed 
 
 
Panel B:  U.S. Direct-listed Chinese and matched U.S. firms Chinese firms (n = 130) U.S. firms (n = 130)     
  # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms p-value  
  
Not Effective Accounting IICs             
Financial statement preparation related issues (Key 40) 34 26.15% 3 2.31% 0.000 *** 
Current assets/investments/collectables related issues (Key 15) 17 13.08% 1 0.77% 0.000 ***  
Related party/subsidiary related issues (Key 38) 17 13.08% 3 2.31% 0.002 ***  
Inventory/cost of sales/ vendor rebate related issues (Key 32) 13 10.00% 3 2.31% 0.018 ** 
Accrual/identification of liability related issues (Key 33) 12 9.23% 3 2.31% 0.030 ** 
Recording of financing/bank/securities debt or equity related issues (Key 47) 9 6.92% 3 2.31% 0.137  
Other (Key 68) 34 26.15% 5 3.85% 0.000 *** 
Not Effective Other IICs             
Personnel related issues (Key 51) 59 45.38% 16 12.31% 0.000 *** 
Previously reported 404 issue, which continues to be disclosed under 302 (Key 63) 50 38.46% 16 12.31% 0.000 ***  
Period end adjustment/correction related issue (Key 53) 17 13.08% 6 4.62% 0.027 ** 
Corporate governance related issues (Key 70) 14 10.77% 2 1.54% 0.003 ***  
Fraud risk related issues (Key 85) 11 8.46% 0 0.00% 0.000 ***  
Ethics code related issues (Key 84) 10 7.69% 1 0.77% 0.010 ** 
Demographic in nature - small size is said to impact controls (Key 66) 8 6.15% 1 0.77% 0.036 ** 
Whistleblower policy related issues (Key 82) 5 3.85% 0 0.00% 0.060 * 
Other (Key 50) 59 45.38% 19 14.62% 0.000 *** 
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Cross-listed U.S.-listed 
 
 
Panel C:  U.S. Cross-listed Chinese and matched U.S. firms Chinese firms (n = 68) U.S. firms (n = 68)     
  # of firms % of firms # of firms % of firms p-value  
  
Not Effective Accounting IICs             
Financial statement preparation related issues (Key 40) 3 4.41% 0 0.00% 0.244  
Current assets/investments/collectables related issues (Key 15) 5 7.35% 1 1.47% 0.208  
Related party/subsidiary related issues (Key 38) 2 2.94% 1 1.47% 1.000  
Inventory/cost of sales/ vendor rebate related issues (Key 32) 2 2.94% 3 4.41% 1.000  
Accrual/identification of liability related issues (Key 33) 2 2.94% 2 2.94% 1.000  
Recording of financing/bank/securities debt or equity related issues (Key 47) 1 1.47% 0 0.00% 1.000  
Other (Key 68) 3 4.41% 3 4.41% 1.000  
Not Effective Other IICs             
Personnel related issues (Key 51) 10 7.69% 7 5.38% 0.605  
Previously reported 404 issue, which continues to be disclosed under 302 (Key 63) 0 0.00% 9 6.92% 0.003 *** 
Period end adjustment/correction related issue (Key 53) 2 1.54% 5 3.85% 0.441  
Corporate governance related issues (Key 70) 1 0.77% 0 0.00% 1.000  
Fraud risk related issues (Key 85) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1.000  
Ethics code related issues (Key 84) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1.000  
Demographic in nature - small size is said to impact controls (Key 66) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1.000  
Whistleblower policy related issues (Key 82) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1.000  
Other (Key 50) 8 6.15% 11 8.46% 0.622   
a Significance levels .01***, .05** and .10* 
b A two-sample test of whether the proportions of two independent Bernoulli populations are identical.  As the sample size is not large, we use the Fisher 
exact test to compute the p-value for H0: c1 = c2 versus H1: c1 not equal c2 (two tail test), where c = number of cases / n. 
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Appendix A – Details of Ineffective Internal Control Types as Classified by Audit Analytics 
Types of “Not Effective Accounting" Ineffective Internal Control Disclosures 
Financial statement preparation related issues (Key 40) 
Indicates failures or inadequacies in internal controls related to review or preparation of financial 
statements, footnotes and/or related additions to financial statements. This can also include issues 
with conversion of foreign company financial statements to U.S. SEC/U.S. GAAP/FASB Standards. 
It also includes internal control deficiencies associated with segment recording and related annual 
report disclosures. 
Current assets/investments/collectables related issues (Key 15) 
Consists of internal control deficiencies in approach, theory or calculations with respect to cash, 
cash equivalents, accounts receivable, short term investments, certain long term investments, notes, 
loans collectible, allowance for uncollectables, notes receivables and/or related reserves. 
Related party/subsidiary related issues (Key 38) 
Consists primarily of internal control deficiencies associated with disclosures about related, alliance, 
affiliated and/or subsidiary entities. This can also refer to accounting issues detected at foreign 
subsidiaries. This box is checked mostly in conjunction with other categories to indicate that an 
issue has been raised in association with a failure at a subsidiary (often foreign sub) that has been 
deemed to be material to the overall financial condition of the company. 
Inventory/cost of sales/ vendor rebate related issues (Key 32) 
Consists of internal control deficiencies in approach, theory or calculation associated with 
transactions affecting inventory, vendor relationships (including rebates) and/or cost of sales. The 
proper recording of inventory can be a complex area of accounting requiring many estimates. The 
issues can range from simple valuation calculations to estimates of completion on construction 
projects. 
Accrual/identification of liability related issues (Key 33) 
Consists of internal control deficiencies associated with the accrual or identification of liabilities on 
the balance sheet. These could range from failures to record pension obligations, to problems with 
establishing the correct amount of payables, accruals or other reserves. From an internal control  
perspective, issues in this area most often occur because of cut‐off failures in recording liabilities 
and matching them to related revenue or inventory accounts. 
Recording of financing/bank/securities debt or equity related issues (Key 47) 
Consists of internal control deficiencies in approach, theory or calculation associated with the 
recording of financing/bank/securities debt or equity section accounts. Control issues in this area 
often arise because of incorrect recording of beneficial conversion features in debt/quasi debt or 
equity securities. They can also relate to the calculation of premiums/discounts on debt securities or 
the proper valuation of certain non‐traded equity securities. 
Other (Key 68) 
This flag is identified when the 404 or 302 disclosures are lacking in sufficient information to 
identify what accounts or areas of financial reporting are being impacted by disclosure controls or 
internal control deficiencies. It may also indicate that a GAAP/FASB effect is not applicable. This 
flag may not be checked in circumstances where a recent section 404 report or restatement can 
provide the missing information. 
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Types of “Not Effective Other" Ineffective Internal Control Disclosures 
Personnel related issues (Key 51) 
Represents circumstances where deficiencies in the number, training, qualifications, conduct or 
personnel are identified as being part of the cause of the disclosure control qualification. It also is 
used when issues associated with segregation of duties are raised as a disclosure control weakness. 
Previously reported 404 issues, which continues to be disclosed under 302 (Key 63) 
Refers to disclosure control reports that make reference to material weaknesses associated with 
previously issued section 404 reports of year-end financial reporting. A reader should consider 
integrating what has been reported in the disclosure control section with that of the section 404 
report to gain a full picture of the weaknesses. This box is checked only when there has been a 
previously issued 404 report issued (as opposed to noticed). 
Period end adjustment/correction related issue (Key 53) 
Used primarily when it is evident that a period end company or auditor initiated adjustment is 
required to correct quarterly or annual financial statements. This category is also checked when it is 
evident that material changes have been required to the period procedures to ensure proper 
recording. In many cases, one has to refer to the annual 404 opinion for support for this 
categorization. 
Corporate governance related issues (Key 70) 
Applies to registrants who identify material weaknesses associated with corporate governance issues 
such as no audit committee or audit committee expert, etc. This category can also apply to a broad 
range of corporate governance issues. 
Fraud risk related issues (Key 85) 
Flags issues involving the implementation or inadequacy of a program for identifying, supervising, 
and managing fraud risk. 
Ethics code related issues (Key 84) 
Flags a problem involving the formulation or implementation of an effective code of ethics. This 
includes but is not limited to the following cases: an ethics code is newly or recently adopted 
(implying a previous non‐adoption); more vigorous attempts to educate management or employees 
with respect to the code; revisions in the code; institution of a requirement to sign the code. 
Demographic in nature - small size of company is stated to impact controls (Key 66) 
This category is demographic in nature and identifies registrants that are claiming that they have 
internal or disclosure control deficiencies that derive from financial, size or similar issues. It does 
not generally include issues associated with segregation of duty issues that are covered elsewhere. 
Whistleblower policy related issues (Key 82) 
Indicates a disclosure or internal control issue involving an inadequate or insufficiently‐
implemented whistleblower policy (also called an 'ethics hotline' or 'anonymous hotline'). 
Other (Key 50) 
A general catch all for disclosure control issues. It can include a range of issues associated with the 
financial close process including issues with timely gathering of data for use in the close process to 
the application of the appropriate FASB principles in the recording. It can also include issues with 
accounting policies and procedures that prevent timely, accurate or complete information from being 
reported. 
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Appendix B – Examples of Management IIC Disclosures  
 
Types of “Not Effective Accounting" Internal Control Disclosures 
Financial statement preparation related issues (Key 40) 
“We did not maintain effective controls over the period-end and year-end closing process to ensure 
the accurate processing our accounts so as to enable us to report our results on a timely basis.” Sino 
Shipping Holdings Inc. 
Current assets/investments/collectables related issues (Key 15) 
“The Company lacked an internal audit department, which rendered the Company ineffective in 
preventing and detecting control lapses and errors in the accounting of certain key areas like revenue 
recognition, purchase approvals, inter-company transactions, cash receipt and cash disbursement 
authorizations, inventory safeguard and proper accumulation for cost of products, in accordance 
with the appropriate costing method used by the Company.” Skystar Bio-Pharmaceutical 
Related party/subsidiary related issues (Key 38) 
“Management excluded from this assessment, the business that we acquired in 2009, because it was 
not possible to conduct an assessment of the business's internal control over financial reporting in 
the period between the consummation date and the date of management’s assessment. With respect 
to excluding this company, we are required to (1) formally note that management is excluding this 
acquired business from management’s report on internal control over financial reporting; (2) clearly 
identify the acquired business excluded and have indicated the significance of the acquired business 
in our company’s consolidated financial statements; and (3) disclose material changes, if any, to our 
internal control over financial reporting due to the acquisition of this business.” China Information 
Security Technology, Inc. 
Inventory/cost of sales/ vendor rebate related issues (Key 32) 
“Failure to record inventory balances at the time of delivery rather than after inspection.” Duoyuan 
Global Water Inc. 
Accrual/identification of liability related issues (Key 33) 
“The Company did not maintain effective controls over the recording of reserves for losses on 
customer contracts.” UTStarcom, Inc. 
Recording of financing/bank/securities debt or equity related issues (Key 47) 
“The material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting communicated by our 
independent registered public accounting firm related to our lack of a sufficient complement of 
personnel with the proper level of accounting knowledge, experience and training in the application 
of U.S. GAAP and compliance with SEC reporting requirements to prepare and review our U.S. 
GAAP financial statements and disclosures, which resulted, for example, in audit adjustments 
and/or additional disclosure related to debt extinguishment and early termination of an operating 
lease.” 7 Days Group Holdings Limited 
Other (Key 68) 
“Inadequate control over filing of material contracts.” Tongjitang Chinese Medicines Company 
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Types of “Not Effective Other" Internal Control Disclosures 
Personnel related issues (Key 51) 
“We have an inadequate number of accounting personnel and, with the exception of our CFO, our 
staff within our finance department and accounting group in the PRC do not have adequate expertise 
in generally accepted accounting principals and the securities laws of the United States to ensure 
proper application thereof.” ZST Digital Networks, Inc. 
Previously reported 404 issues, which continues to be disclosed under 302 (Key 63) 
“Based on our evaluation, our Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer have concluded 
that the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures were not effective at March 31, 2009 due to 
the fact that the material weaknesses in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting 
described in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 
2008 have not been remediated as of March 31, 2009” ShengdaTech, Inc. 
Period end adjustment/correction related issue (Key 53) 
“The lack of adequate U.S. GAAP review resulted in some material audit adjustments for the year 
ended December 31, 2009, which were made to eliminate intercompany transactions, adjust taxes 
payable for tax provision, adjust deferred tax, and record prior year audit adjustments to adjust the 
allowance for doubtful accounts.” China Shenghuo Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc. 
Corporate governance related issues (Key 70) 
“We do not have an audit committee or a financial expert on our Board of Directors.” Chang-On 
International, Inc. 
Fraud risk related issues (Key 85) 
“The Company lacks an effective anti-fraud program, including an effective whistle-blower 
program, designed to detect and prevent fraud. The Company fails to conduct consistent background 
checks of personnel in positions of responsibility and establish an ongoing program to manage 
identified fraud risks.” Diguang International Development Co., Ltd. 
Ethics code related issues (Key 84) 
Describes the need for an "established and implemented the code of ethics for senior officers and 
employees." China Valves Technology, Inc. 
Demographic in nature - small size of company is stated to impact controls (Key 66) 
“As a small company, we do not have sufficient personnel to set up adequate review function at 
each reporting level.” Sino Clean Energy Inc. 
Whistleblower policy related issues (Key 82) 
“At present, there is a whistle blower channel via manager’s email and telephone, but no formal 
whistle blower policy (including channel, responsible department, confidential policy, monitoring 
policy, etc.” Telestone Technologies Corporation 
Other (Key 50) 
“insufficient or lack of written policies and procedures relating to the periodic review of current 
policies and procedures and their implementation.” Puda Coal, Inc. 
 
	  
